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Whenever a new corporate or governmental scandal erupts, onlookers 
ask, “Where were the lawyers?”  Why would attorneys not have advised 
their clients of the risks posed by conduct that, from an outsider’s 
perspective, appears indefensible?  When numerous red flags have gone 
unheeded, people often conclude that the lawyers’ failure to sound the 
alarm must be caused by greed, incompetence, or both.  A few scholars 
have suggested that unconscious cognitive bias may better explain such 
lapses in judgment, but they have not explained why particular situations 
are more likely than others to encourage such bias.  This Article seeks to 
fill that gap.  Drawing on research from behavioral and social psychology, 
it suggests that lawyers’ apparent lapses in judgment may be caused by 
cognitive biases arising from partisan kinship between lawyer and client.  
The Article uses identity theory to distinguish particular situations in 
which attorney judgment is likely to be compromised, and it recommends 
strategies to enhance attorney independence and minimize judgment 
errors. 
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Judgment, Identity, and Independence 
CASSANDRA BURKE ROBERTSON* 
I.  INTRODUCTION:  “WHERE WERE THE LAWYERS?” 
Whenever corporate and governmental scandals erupt, onlookers are 
quick to ask, “Where were the lawyers?”1  From the savings and loan 
failures of the 1980s, through Enron’s collapse, Hewlett-Packard’s 
pretexting operation,2 the repudiated interrogation memos from the Office 
of Legal Counsel,3 and countless less-publicized mishaps and failures, 
courts and commentators have questioned why on Earth the high-level 
attorneys involved in each case did not steer their clients to safer legal 
ground. 
Onlookers often conclude that, because the detrimental legal 
consequences of the clients’ decisions were so clear, the lawyers involved 
must have been complicit in client wrongdoing.  Professor Donald 
Langevoort coined the term “venality hypothesis,” to describe this 
phenomenon, and others have similarly adopted the phrase.4  The venality 
hypothesis has been proffered as an explanation for nearly every legal 
scandal, as people assume that the lawyers were greedy, willfully 
                                                                                                                          
* Assistant Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.  For their thoughtful 
comments on earlier drafts, I thank Jonathan Adler, Peter J. Burke, Kathleen Clark, Jonathan Entin, 
Peter Gerhart, Raymond Ku, Robert Lawry, Jacqueline Lipton, Christopher Lund, Lynn M. Mather, 
Kevin McMunigal, Jane Moriarty, Thomas Robertson, Jan E. Stets, and Wendy Wagner.  Earlier 
versions of this Article were presented at the Ohio Legal Scholars Workshop and the 2009 Law and 
Society Annual Meeting.  I also thank Case Western Reserve University School of Law for supporting 
this project with summer research funding, and I thank the members of the Connecticut Law Review for 
their helpful editing and advice. 
1 See, e.g., Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) (“Where 
were these professionals . . . when these clearly improper transactions were being consummated? . . . 
What is difficult to understand is that with all the professional talent involved . . . why at least one 
professional would not have blown the whistle to stop the overreaching that took place in this case.”). 
2 See Hewlett-Packard’s Pretexting Scandal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 13 (2006) (including questions 
from a Congress member:  “[W]here were the lawyers?  The red flags were waving all over the place,” 
but “none of the lawyers stepped up to their responsibilities.”). 
3 See infra Part IV. 
4 Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers’ 
Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 77–78 (1993) (“To pose the question of 
attorney motivation is to invite a prompt answer from many people: greed and moral corruption, of 
course.  Lawyers know of their clients’ misdeeds, or at best deliberately close their eyes to the 
evidence, simply to preserve their wealth, status and power.”).  See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, The Banality 
of Fraud: Resituating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 991 (2005). 
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incompetent, or too weak to resist client pressure.5  Federal Judge William 
G. Young clearly articulated the venality hypothesis in a recent pharmacy 
antitrust case.6  After concluding that the defendants had clearly colluded 
to inhibit competition, he asked, “Where were the lawyers here?”7  He 
pointed out that the defendants included one of Massachusetts’s foremost 
pharmacy chains and one of its leading HMOs and stated that “[s]urely 
lawyers must have been in on this deal at its inception.  Yet no fair-minded 
lawyer . . . could have countenanced [the client’s action] and thought they 
were doing aught but attempting an end run around the law.”8  He queried 
whether there was “no lawyer on either side who cautioned against this 
rather blatant attempt to frustrate the legislative will,” and concluded that 
“[t]here should have been.  The conduct of the lawyers who vetted this deal 
was ‘too slick by half.’”9 
The key assumption in the venality hypothesis—that because the legal 
pitfalls of a decision are so obvious, a lawyer’s failure to caution against 
the client’s action must amount to complicity or weakness in the face of 
pressure—runs through other cases as well.  One lawyer’s conduct in the 
fall of the BCCI bank has been described as “almost forc[ing] the observer 
who reviews the evidence in retrospect to conclude that he was either 
stupid or venal,” and noting that “[h]is career up to this point rules out 
stupidity.”10  In gentler terms, Jack Goldsmith, the former head of the 
Office of Legal Counsel framed a similar argument about John Yoo, the 
lawyer who drafted subsequently withdrawn memoranda defining torture 
in detainee interrogation.  Because Yoo possessed great “knowledge, 
intelligence and energy” but nonetheless drafted “very important opinions” 
of extremely “poor quality,” Goldsmith concluded that the errant legal 
conclusions were likely due, in part, to the attorney’s succumbing to 
“pressure from the White House”—and not merely to mistake or 
incompetence.11 
While this theme is common, it is not a universal explanation for 
attorneys’ failure to warn of seemingly obvious legal pitfalls.  Close 
analysis of the events leading up to recent scandals fails to support the 
narrative of professional misconduct.  Yoo, for example, denied the 
                                                                                                                          
5 See Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the Materiality Standard in the Enforcement of the 
Federal Securities Laws, 62 BUS. LAW. 317, 344 (2007) (“[E]very major financial scandal is attended 
by cries of, ‘Where were the accountants?  Where were the lawyers?’”). 
6 J.E. Pierce Apothecary, Inc. v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 119, 150 n.16 
(D. Mass. 2005). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. (quoting Fed. Refinance Co. v. Klock, 229 F. Supp. 2d 26, 29 n.2 (D. Mass. 2002), rev’d on 
other grounds, 352 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2003)). 
10 Langevoort, supra note 4, at 77–78. 
11 Jeffrey Rosen, Conscience of a Conservative, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 9, 2007, at 40. 
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existence of White House pressure and vehemently defended his work on 
the interrogation opinions.12  Many of Enron’s problems were later traced 
to “a series of unconsciously biased judgments rather than a deliberate 
program of criminality.”13  Of course, such defenses do not prove the 
absence of wrongdoing, and this Article does not rule out conscious self-
interest as an explanation for many instances of bad legal advice.  But in 
those cases where there is no evidence of external pressure, greed, or 
incompetence, it suggests that a more nuanced examination of attorney 
judgment is necessary. 
Inspired by work in the cognitive and behavioral sciences, a few 
scholars are beginning to argue that “unconsciously biased judgments” are 
at issue in recent scandals and to challenge the notion that such failure 
necessarily results from either venality or stupidity.14  According to these 
scholars, lawyers’ lapses in judgment—even severe lapses—may be 
unconscious and innocent of venal motive, caused instead by cognitive 
biases that lead to a “diminished capacity to perceive danger signals.”15 
But innocent failures are by no means benign.  Regardless of whether 
bad legal advice is caused by innocent cognitive bias or by venal 
wrongdoing, it results in the same costs and consequences to the client.  
Furthermore, cognitive failures are even more difficult to recognize and 
avoid than are conscious misdeeds,16 thus creating additional difficulties 
for the client. 
So far, the legal literature has not fully explored the factors that 
promote such judgment-affecting cognitive bias.  This Article seeks to 
begin filling that gap.  Drawing on identity theory from social psychology, 
it develops an explanatory hypothesis for why certain situations may 
prompt lawyers to deviate from a neutral perspective more often than 
others and how that lack of neutrality prevents the lawyers from offering 
fully independent advice to their clients.  It focuses on situations in which 
there is no direct financial incentive or other external incentive to explain 
lawyers’ biased judgment, with particular attention to governmental and in-
house corporate attorneys who have no direct financial stake in their 
clients’ cases. 
Part II of this Article examines some of the most common cognitive 
biases affecting partisans generally.  Part III offers background in identity 
theory, analyzes recent research on lawyer identity and decision making, 
                                                                                                                          
12 Id. 
13 Max H. Bazerman et al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, 80 HARV. BUS. REV. 96, 97 
(2002). 
14 See Langevoort, supra note 4, at 95; see also Bazerman et al., supra note 13, at 97. 
15 Langevoort, supra note 4, at 95. 
16 See HERBERT A. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 96 (1983) (“Most of the bias that 
arises . . . cannot be described correctly as rooted in dishonesty—which perhaps makes it more 
insidious than if it were.”). 
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and applies identity theory to explain why lawyers in certain situations 
may be particularly vulnerable to the cognitive biases outlined in Part II.  
Part IV ties cognition, judgment, and identity together in a case study of 
government-attorney decision making in the Office of Legal Counsel.  
Finally, Part V identifies two situations in which there is a particularly high 
risk of cognitive bias: first, situations in which the attorney performs a 
policy making or managerial role in the client’s organization, and second, 
where the attorney is motivated by a deep commitment to, and 
identification with, a social cause beyond the case itself.  Part V concludes 
by offering recommendations for optimizing the independence of legal 
advice in the face of powerful cognitive challenges. 
II.  PARTISANSHIP, ROLES, AND PERCEPTUAL FILTERS 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide that “[i]n 
representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional 
judgment and render candid advice.”17  Maintaining such independence 
and neutrality may be easier said than done.  Lawyers are never completely 
independent of their clients, and the stronger their partisan18 affiliation with 
their clients or with a related social cause, the greater the risk that they will 
lack an independent perspective.19  The partisan bias that arises from such 
affiliation may be viewed as a subtype of what has been referred to as 
“cultural cognition”—the “psychological disposition of persons to conform 
their factual beliefs about the instrumental efficacy (or perversity) of law to 
their cultural evaluations of the activities subject to regulation.”20 
This section discusses how partisan bias can affect both the extent to 
which lawyers notice or attend to relevant issues and the interpretation they 
give to those issues.  Both attention and interpretation are essential to 
decision making, and yet, as this section discusses, both are subject to the 
possibility of bias.21  Noticing information “picks up major events and 
gross trends,” while interpretation or “sensemaking,” by contrast, “focuses 
                                                                                                                          
17 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2007).  Independence and neutrality may also be 
elements of a lawyer’s duty of competence, as competence requires “analysis of the factual and legal 
elements of the problem.”  Id. at R. 1.1 & cmt. 5 (2007). 
18 The term “partisan” is used in its broadest sense of allegiance to a client and does not to refer 
political partisanship. 
19 See infra Part IV (discussing partisanship in context of torture memo controversy). 
20 Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition of Public Policy, 24 YALE J. L. & PUB. 
POLICY 149, 152 (2006).  For purposes of this Article, I do not consider whether cognitive biases and 
bounded rationality in general are epistemically distinct from cultural cognition; both frameworks 
appear helpful for understanding the sources and effects of partisan bias, and neither is inconsistent 
with an identity-theory approach to analyzing such bias.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1110, 1123–24 (2006) (book review) (noting controversy over whether “cultural 
cognition” was different from, or a part of, bounded rationality). 
21 William H. Starbuck & Frances J. Milliken, Executives’ Perceptual Filters: What They Notice 
and How They Make Sense, in THE EXECUTIVE EFFECT 35, 60 (Donald C. Hambrick ed., 1988). 
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on subtleties and interdependencies.”22  If information is tuned out or not 
noticed, of course, then it is not available to be integrated into the lawyer’s 
interpretation of the situation at hand.23 
A.  Selective Attention, Noticing, and Recall 
All human beings filter information.  People cannot pay equal attention 
to everything in their environment—to do so would mean, for example, 
that a person would hear “background noise as loudly as voice or music” 
and would be unable to enjoy a symphony or to focus on partners in a 
conversation.24  As a result, people must engage in perceptual filtering in 
order to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information, attending 
more to information they find relevant than to information they perceive as 
irrelevant.25  For example, witnesses to a crime are typically better able to 
recall the characteristics of the weapon used than the characteristics of the 
perpetrator behind the weapon, as the weapon presents an immediate threat 
that draws the witness’s focus.26 
While filtering is necessary, it can introduce cognitive bias, as people’s 
filters more often flag information favorable to preexisting beliefs or 
desires as “relevant.”27  More than half a century ago, a pair of social 
scientists documented the influence of partisanship on perception.28  They 
showed undergraduate students from Dartmouth and Princeton a film of a 
rowdy football game between the two schools.  Both teams had been 
repeatedly penalized for rule infractions, Princeton’s star player exited 
during the second quarter with a broken nose, and a Dartmouth player 
suffered a broken leg.  The researchers who showed the film asked 
students to count the number of rule infractions by each team, to rate those 
infractions as “flagrant” or “mild,” and to determine which team started the 
“rough play.”29 
The Princeton students reached very different conclusions than the 
Dartmouth students.  They viewed the “facts” of the game differently, 
                                                                                                                          
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 40; see also SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 21 
(1993) (“Perceptions are, by their very nature, selective.”).   
25 Starbuck & Milliken, supra note 21, at 41. 
26 Fredrik H. Leinfelt, Descriptive Eyewitness Testimony: The Influence of Emotionality, Racial 
Identification, Question Style, and Selective Perception, 29 CRIM. JUST. REV. 317, 322 (2004). 
27 Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 129, 129 (1954); see also Starbuck & Milliken, supra note 21, at 40.  As well as introducing 
bias, selective perception can also build on people’s preexisting biases; research has shown both that 
eyewitnesses are better able to remember faces of people from their own racial group than from 
distinctly different groups, and that they rated criminal acts as being more culpable when the 
perpetrator is ethnically dissimilar to themselves.  Leinfelt, supra note 26, at 321. 
28 Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 27, at 129–30. 
29 Id. at 130. 
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paying selective attention to the facts favorable to their team.  The 
Princeton students recorded twice as many Dartmouth rule infractions as 
Princeton ones and judged the Dartmouth rule infractions to be more often 
flagrant than Princeton’s infractions.30  Eighty-six percent of Princeton 
students believed that the Dartmouth team started the rough play.31  By 
contrast, the Dartmouth students recorded nearly equal numbers of rule 
infractions between the two teams and believed that fewer of their team’s 
infractions were “flagrant.”32  Nor did they agree that their team had started 
the rough play—a majority (fifty-three percent) of the Dartmouth students 
stated that both teams started the rough play.33 
Selective attention carries over into the legal and business spheres.34  
In one study, researchers gave participants a file of information about a 
negligence lawsuit and assigned them the role of either the motorcyclist 
plaintiff or the car-driving defendant.35  The participants were paired up, 
asked to attempt to reach a fair settlement, and told that the judge would 
impose a significant penalty if they failed to reach a settlement.36  
Participants were also asked to predict the judge’s award and to recall 
arguments in favor of both sides.37  In spite of the fact that both sides 
received identical information, participants’ predictions of the judges’ 
awards varied by role—those representing the plaintiff predicted awards 
$14,537 higher than the awards predicted by those representing the 
defendant.38  Both sides, when asked to list the arguments made in the 
case, were more likely to recall arguments in their favor.39  Similar effects 
have been reported in studies of other professionals.40 
                                                                                                                          
30 Id. at 131–32. 
31 Id. at 131. 
32 Id. at 131–32. 
33 Id. at 131.  By way of comparison, “[t]he official statistics of the game, which Princeton won, 
showed that Dartmouth was penalized 70 yards, Princeton 25, not counting more than a few plays in 
which both sides were penalized.”  Id. at 129. 
34 Behavioral economists often describe a professional’s tendency to selectively attend to 
favorable information as a species of “self-serving bias.”  See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. 
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 
88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1093 (2000).  This Article prefers to use the term “partisan bias” to encompass 
situations in which the actor (here, usually the lawyer) may not personally benefit, but an associated 
affiliate (here, usually the client) will.  See Leigh Thompson, “They Saw a Negotiation”: Partisanship 
and Involvement, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 839, 840–41 (1995) (noting that partisan 
observers may be induced to find support for a particular outcome). 
35 George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 135, 145 (1993). 
36 Id. at 145–46. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 150. 
39 Id. at 150–51 (noting that the plaintiffs recalled an average of 1.04 more arguments favoring 
themselves, while the defendants recalled an average of 2.79 more arguments favoring themselves). 
40 See Don A. Moore et al., Auditor Independence, Conflict of Interest, and the Unconscious 
Intrusion of Bias, available at https://littlehurt.gsia.cmu.edu/gsiadoc/wp/2002-19.pdf (accountants). 
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Such variation in the prediction of litigation outcomes is likely to 
affect the advice lawyers provide to their clients.  If the plaintiff’s lawyer 
values the claim higher than a neutral decision maker (such as judge or 
jury) would actually award, then the lawyer would likely offer misleading 
and unhelpful settlement advice to the client.  Likewise, a defense attorney 
who undervalues the plaintiff’s likely recovery would similarly offer 
misleading advice.  In both cases, the partisan bias compromises the 
attorney’s ability to offer competent and truly independent advice.  And in 
both cases, the client is likely to end up disappointed in the lawyer when 
the actual outcome is less favorable than the attorney had advised. 
B.  Selective Interpretation 
While selective attention describes what facts are noticed, attended to, 
and ultimately recalled, selective interpretation describes how those facts 
are evaluated.  Again, people’s roles and allegiances influence their 
interpretations of an event.  In the football game study, for example, 
students from the two schools employed selective interpretation in 
evaluating the motives and accusations surrounding the game.41  A 
majority of Dartmouth students believed that Princeton was alleging that 
“Dartmouth tried to get [Princeton’s star player]” and that Dartmouth 
played “intentionally dirty.”42  Only ten percent of Dartmouth students 
believed these allegations were actually true, whereas fifty-five percent of 
Princeton students believed them.43  Students also differed as to why they 
thought the charges were being made:  Dartmouth students were more 
likely to believe that the charges were made because Princeton’s star 
player had been injured, while Princeton students were more likely to 
believe that the charges were made to prevent repetition of such a rough 
game.44  Thus, the different allegiances led to very different interpretations 
of the controversy surrounding the game. 
Selective interpretation can produce unintended consequences, as 
shown by a study involving perceptions of Archie Bunker in the 1970s 
television sitcom All in the Family.  Bunker was an exaggeratedly bigoted 
character; his actions on the show were intended by the producer to reduce 
prejudice “by bringing bigotry out into the open and showing it to be 
illogical.”45  Producers believed that the show satirized bigotry by 
portraying Archie Bunker as a “fool,” and others agreed: the show won an 
                                                                                                                          
41 Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 27, at 130–32. 
42 Id. at 131. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 WERNER J. SEVERIN & JAMES W. TANKARD, JR., COMMUNICATION THEORIES: ORIGINS, 
METHODS, AND USES IN THE MASS MEDIA 80 (4th ed. 1997). 
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award in 1972 from the NAACP.46  However, when Neil Vidmar and 
Milton Rokeach conducted a study of viewers in 1974, it became clear that 
audience members interpreted the show in vastly different ways.47  
Viewers who were themselves high in prejudice did not perceive that 
Archie was being made fun of; instead, they were more likely to report that 
one or more of the non-prejudiced characters on the show were more often 
the target of the sitcom’s humor.48  When asked who “won” or who “lost” 
on a particular show, those low in prejudice would pick Archie as the loser, 
while those high in prejudice would pick one of the other characters.49  
Thus, only those already low in prejudice were likely to pick up on the 
show’s message of the illogicality of prejudice; those with preexisting bias 
were likely to have their biases reinforced by the show.50 
Selective interpretation could similarly affect a lawyer’s judgment 
about a case.  A plaintiff’s lawyer predisposed to sympathize with an 
injured client may interpret ambiguous medical records as providing 
greater support for her client’s claim of injury, while a defense attorney, 
predisposed to be skeptical of the claim, may interpret those same records 
less generously.  In addition, lawyers on both sides may find their clients’ 
explanations of the situation more credible than a neutral observer would 
find them to be.  As with selective attention, selective interpretation is 
likely to foster a belief that a client’s case is stronger than it actually is.  To 
the extent that this belief is communicated to the client, the client may end 
up quite disappointed when the outcome of the case is less favorable than 
the attorney had predicted. 
C.  Bias Blind Spot 
Because individuals are not consciously aware of how cognitive biases 
affect their perception, the biases cannot always be put aside even when 
people make a concerted effort to maintain a neutral viewpoint.  For 
example, when study participants made efforts to view the football game 
neutrally in order to participate in the study, their allegiance still 
influenced—albeit unconsciously—their view of the game.  One 
Dartmouth alumnus who viewed a film of the game had heard from a 
Princeton alumni group about the many rule infractions committed by 
Dartmouth players.51  When the Dartmouth alumnus was unable to 
perceive the same infractions that the Princeton alumni had told him about, 
                                                                                                                          
46 Id. 
47 Id. (citing Neil Vidmar & Milton Rokeach, Archie Bunker’s Bigotry: A Study in Selective 
Perception and Exposure, 24 J. COM. 36, 40 (1974)). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 27, at 132. 
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he assumed that the problem was an incomplete film, not a difference of 
perception.52  He sent a telegram to the researchers:  “Preview of Princeton 
movies indicates considerable cutting of important part please wire 
explanation and possibly air mail missing part before showing scheduled 
for January 25 we have splicing equipment.”53 
Even when people understand the existence of cognitive biases on a 
theoretical level, they still tend to believe that their own judgment remains 
unaffected.  Researchers have been able to manipulate a “liking bias” by 
asking subjects to evaluate a hypothetical roommate conflict involving 
characters who were similar or dissimilar to the study participants—for 
example, one character was described as a student who was “from 
Alabama, liked country . . . music, and enjoyed sharing her religious views 
with others.”54  Subjects were asked how much they liked each character, 
how fair they felt they were being in mediating the conflict, and to what 
extent they believed they were biased.55 
The researchers concluded that the “liking bias” unconsciously 
influenced participants’ responses.56  Although the study participants 
believed that they were being fair and making decisions based on the 
evidence, not on their preferences, their decisions did in fact differ based 
on characters’ described traits.  Furthermore, study participants remained 
unaware of the effect of this situational bias even when the study “rather 
blatant[ly]” introduced background material on the characters, making 
study participants aware of factors such as religious preferences, music 
preferences, and other background information.57  Thus, the researchers 
concluded that “[e]ven though the information causing the preference [i.e., 
background material regarding music preferences, religious views, etc.] 
was consciously perceived, the effects of this information on conflict 
perceptions were not.”58 
D.  Effects of Partisan Bias 
The effects of partisan affiliation, selective perception, and selective 
interpretation can combine to cause people to experience the same events 
in vastly different ways.  They create individual realities that may not 
match those of others:  “We can watch a football game, a person eating a 
hamburger, or a couple arguing as if these are ‘things’ that are ‘out there’ 
                                                                                                                          
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Cynthia McPherson Frantz, I AM Being Fair: The Bias Blind Spot as a Stumbling Block to 
Seeing Both Sides, 28 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 157, 161 (2006). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 162. 
57 Id. at 163. 
58 Id. 
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to be viewed in one way; and yet what we ‘see’ is significantly determined 
by influences beyond our conscious purview.”59  Similarly, it is not that 
Princeton and Dartmouth students merely had different attitudes about the 
same game—instead, to them, there were two very different games.  
Researchers in the football study concluded therefore “there is no such 
‘thing’ as a ‘game’ existing ‘out there’ in its own right which people 
merely ‘observe.’”60  “The game ‘exists’ for a person and is experienced by 
him only in so far as certain happenings have significances in terms of his 
purpose.”61 
Lawyers are subject to the same cognitive processes that affect others.  
The resulting viewpoint can be considered both a “partisan” bias that is 
based on an affiliation with the client or a litigation-related social cause, 
and a “self-serving” bias, as the lawyer benefits from the client’s success.62  
This Article focuses on those situations in which there is no obvious 
external benefit to the lawyer.  It concludes that, in certain circumstances, 
lawyers develop a partisan affiliation with a client or with a social cause 
connected to the client, and it argues that this affiliation may very well lead 
attorneys to unconsciously perceive the world favorably to their clients.  
Thus, while outsiders may see red flags and may believe that no “fair 
minded lawyer . . . could have countenanced” the client’s action,63 the 
lawyer may have a very different view of reality. 
III.  IDENTITY THEORY 
As discussed in the prior section, partisan affiliation can lead to 
systematic cognitive biases.  Accordingly, biases arising from the partisan 
nature of the lawyer-client relationship can cloud and distort attorney 
judgment.  Simulations of settlement negotiations suggest that these biases 
regularly affect legal judgment.64  The resulting failures in legal judgment 
differ from case to case, however.  Until now, little attention has been paid 
to the question of what particular conditions or situational influences are 
likely to trigger such biases.  This Article suggests that recent research on 
identity theory may shed some light on the conditions likely to predispose 
attorneys to such cognitive biases and errors in judgment. 
Identity theory, first articulated in 1966,65 focuses on the relationship 
                                                                                                                          
59 Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Naïve Cynicism: Maintaining False Perceptions in Policy 
Debates, 57 EMORY L.J. 499, 518–19 (2008). 
60 Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 27, at 133. 
61 Id. 
62 See Thompson, supra note 34, at 839; Loewenstein et al., supra note 35, at 140–41. 
63 J.E. Pierce Apothecary, Inc. v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 119, 149 
n.16 (D. Mass. 2005). 
64 Loewenstein et al., supra note 35, at 141. 
65 Sheldon Stryker & Peter J. Burke, The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory, 63 SOC. 
PSYCHOL. Q. 284, 284 n.2 (2000). 
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of the individual to society.  One of its major principles is that individuals 
define themselves in part through the groups they interact with in society 
and the roles they take on—for example, a person may be, at the same 
time, a spouse, a parent, a teacher, a southerner, a member of the middle 
class, and a leader.66  Each of these categories possesses certain culturally 
shared meanings and expectations.  When people internalize the meanings 
and expectations associated with these categories, these roles and group 
memberships are termed “identities,” and become “a set of standards that 
guide behavior.”67 
Of course, each person possesses a number of identities, and not all 
will guide behavior at a given time.  A second major part of identity theory 
is the concept of “salience,” which is defined as the likelihood of a 
particular identity’s activation.68  Thus, “the higher the salience of an 
identity relative to other identities incorporated into the self, the greater the 
probability of behavioral choices in accord with the expectations attached 
to that identity.”69  Salience, in turn, is related to commitment—“the 
degree to which persons’ relationships to others in their networks depend 
on possessing a particular identity and role.”70  Empirical research supports 
the idea that commitment shapes the salience of an identity, and salience in 
turn shapes behavior.71  In one study, for example, researchers found that 
commitment to role relationships based on a religious identity predicted the 
salience of the religious identities—so a person with close family, friends, 
or other significant relationships in a shared religion is likely to have a 
more salient religious identity than a person with fewer ties.72  In turn, the 
salience of the religious identity predicted the amount of time persons 
spent in religious activities.73 
A.  Lawyers’ Identities 
Lawyers, like other individuals, possess a salience hierarchy of 
identities that influence behavior.  While few scholars have examined 
lawyer behavior through the lens of identity theory, one study of corporate 
                                                                                                                          
66 See Matthew O. Hunt, Identities and Inequalities: Exploring Links Between Self and 
Stratification Processes, in ADVANCES IN IDENTITY THEORY AND RESEARCH 71, 76–77 (Peter J. Burke 
et al. eds., 2003). 
67 Jan E. Stets & Peter J. Burke, Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory, 63 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 
224, 225 (2000) (“In identity theory, the core of an identity is the categorization of the self as an 
occupant of a role, and the incorporation, into the self, of the meanings and expectations associated 
with that role and its performance.”). 
68 Id. at 230. 
69 Stryker & Burke, supra note 65, at 286. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
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counsel may shed some light on attorney decision making.  Hugh and Sally 
Gunz, professors of organizational behavior and business law, respectively, 
surveyed several hundred Canadian attorneys who worked in-house as 
corporate counsel.74  The attorneys were asked questions about how long 
they had worked for the corporation, how involved they were with the 
corporation’s strategic decision making, and whether they were part of the 
corporation’s top management team.75  They were also asked to rate their 
view of their role as a corporate lawyer to establish whether they viewed 
themselves more as an employee (who also happened to have a law degree) 
or more as a lawyer (who also happened to be employed by the 
corporation).76  The researchers used this scale as an approximation of 
identity salience—those lower on the scale were said to have a more salient 
“professional” identity, and those higher on the scale were said to have a 
more salient “organizational” identity.77 
The researchers then examined whether the relative salience of the 
“organizational” and “professional” identities would affect lawyer 
behavior.78  Specifically, the survey then presented the attorneys with a 
series of four vignettes, each of which presented a dilemma and required 
the attorney to assess how he or she would advise the corporate client.79  
The vignettes were intended not to be leading, but each did have both a 
generally accepted “professionally correct” course of action and another 
possible course of action that was more deferential to the organization’s 
leadership.80  For example, one vignette was based on actual events 
occurring at Texaco.81  The lawyer in the scenario observes senior 
colleagues at the corporation frequently making racist comments.  The 
lawyer is faced with a choice of options.  The first option is to approach the 
colleagues privately to explain that their comments put the company at risk 
and suggest to them that they “relax only when they are meeting with 
colleagues in whom they have great trust.”82  The second option is to put 
                                                                                                                          
74 Hugh Gunz & Sally Gunz, Hired Professional to Hired Gun: An Identity Theory Approach to 
Understanding the Ethical Behaviour of Professionals in Non-Professional Organizations, 60 HUM. 
REL. 851, 859 (2007). 
75 Id. at 864. 
76 Id. (providing a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “Lawyer with captive client,” 3 being “Both 
lawyer with client and employee with law degree,” and 5 being “Employee of organization who 
happens to have [a] law degree”). 
77 See id. at 855 (defining the two identities as “organizational” and “professional”). 
78 Id. at 874. 
79 Id. at 861–63. 
80 Id. at 874. 
81 Id. at 861; see also Kurt Eichenwald, Texaco Executives, on Tape, Discussed Impeding a Bias 
Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at A1 (discussing an incident involving Texaco board members); 
Courtland Milloy, Texaco Taps a Deep Well of Racism, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1996, at B1 (discussing 
the Texaco incident). 
82 Gunz & Gunz, supra note 74, at 886. 
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the issue on the agenda for the top management team to discuss and to 
report the matter to the board of directors if the management team fails to 
take appropriate action.83 
In another vignette, the attorney was told that the corporation’s CEO is 
contracting with a personal friend for corporate services and that the 
contractor appears to be overcharging for his work.84  The attorney is again 
presented with close-ended options and is asked which is preferable.85  In 
the first option, the attorney will request proposals from other suppliers, 
bring an alternative proposal to the CEO, and, if necessary, bring it to the 
board of directors.  In the second option, the attorney will still request 
proposals and bring them to the CEO’s attention, but will defer to the 
CEO’s judgment if the CEO decides not to pursue the matter.86 
Just as identity theory suggests, the researchers did in fact find that the 
relative salience of the “organizational” and “professional” identities 
affected reported behavior.87  Attorneys who identified more strongly as 
employees were statistically more likely to choose the more 
organizationally deferential options in the vignettes, and those who 
identified more strongly as “lawyers with a captive client” were more 
likely to choose the more professionally oriented option.88  The researchers 
therefore concluded that the salience of lawyer identity does shape ethical 
behavior.89 
The researchers had also hypothesized that the lawyers’ commitment 
to their roles as “employee” and “lawyer” would influence the salience of 
those identities.  Again, the data supported that hypothesis.90  The survey 
results demonstrated a correlation between the amount of time spent on 
activities that do not require a law degree (such as business planning, 
management, and administration) and the salience of the “organizational” 
identity—that is, the more time the attorney spent on business concerns, 
the more the attorney identified as an “employee” of the corporation rather 
than as a “lawyer with a captive client.”91 
The researchers did not focus on the distinction between lawyer 
behavior and lawyer judgment.  Nevertheless, the survey results suggest 
that identity salience can affect judgment as well as behavior.  The 
vignettes were phrased to ask not what the attorney would do, but what the 
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85 Id. at 883. 
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87 Id. at 871. 
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89 Id. at 870–71. 
90 Id. at 868, 871. 
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attorney should do.92  If identity influenced behavior alone, then one might 
expect that an attorney with a strong “organizational” role would be able to 
recognize the professionally correct response, but, perhaps fearful of the 
consequences, would be unable or unwilling to enact it.  Such behavior 
would reinforce the venality hypothesis, noted earlier, which suggests that 
the lawyers must be somewhat complicit in client misconduct.93  
Essentially, such lawyers would suffer not from an ability to see the proper 
response, but rather from a lack of moral courage in implementing that 
response. 
Interestingly, however, the responses to the vignettes suggest that the 
problem is not merely one of moral courage—instead, there is evidence 
that, at least in certain conditions, lawyers truly do not recognize the 
“professionally correct” course of action.  Under the wording of the 
vignettes, the attorneys were asked to make a judgment call about the 
correct answer without considering whether they themselves would be 
capable of taking that action.  Because the attorneys’ responses reported 
differences in judgment (what an attorney “should” do), not just behavior 
(what the particular attorney “would” do), the study supports the 
conclusion that lawyer identity can in fact shape lawyer judgment.94 
B.  Self-Verification: Linking Judgment, Behavior, and Identity 
The Gunz and Gunz study did not examine how lawyers’ identities 
shaped their answers to the vignettes.  Identity theory, however, suggests 
that a mechanism called “self-verification” ties both behavior and 
judgment to identity.95  Self-verification is the process by which 
individuals maintain a stable set of identities.96  When a particular identity 
is activated in a given situation, the internalized meanings and expectations 
associated with the identity act as a standard that the person then compares 
to his or her “perceptions of meanings within the situation.”97  That is, 
individuals compare their own self-perception to the feedback they get 
from others.  When a person’s situational perceptions match his or her 
identity standard, self-verification occurs and the person experiences 
                                                                                                                          
92 Id. at 882–86. 
93 See supra text accompanying notes 4–11. 
94 Gunz & Gunz, supra note 74, at 874. 
95 Stets & Burke, supra note 67, at 232. 
96 Researchers have found that people are motivated to maintain stable identities, as “people tend 
to resist changes in their self—both the structure (e.g., current salience hierarchy) and the meanings 
defining the identities they hold.”  Peter J. Burke, Introduction to ADVANCES IN IDENTITY THEORY 
AND RESEARCH 1, 4 (Peter J. Burke et al. eds., 2003). 
97 Stryker & Burke, supra note 65, at 287. 
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positive emotions.98  So, for example, someone who identifies herself as a 
“good student” will compare this identity to the feedback she gets from 
others around her.  When she receives an “A” on an exam, her internal 
identity standard matches her perception of how others see her, and she 
experiences self-verification.  Her student identity is reinforced, and she 
experiences positive emotions. 
Identity theory suggests that lawyers with a more salient 
“organizational” identity are acting to maintain that identity when they 
choose a course of action in the vignettes.  By choosing the course of 
action associated with organizational deference, those with a more salient 
“employee/organizational” identity are reaffirming their view of 
themselves as organizational agents who implement company objectives.  
Those with a more salient “lawyer/professional” identity similarly reaffirm 
their view of themselves as advisors to the organizations who provide 
neutral counsel. 
Research in identity theory further suggests that when an identity 
standard does not match the situational perception (for example, when an 
“A-level student” receives a “B” on an exam), then negative emotions such 
as anger, depression, and distress may result.99  In such a situation, the 
person will act to bridge the gap between the situational perception and the 
identity standard, either by changing the situation (for example, by 
modifying study habits in an effort to improve grades in the future) or by 
“seeking and creating new situations in which perceived self-relevant 
meanings match those of the identity standard” (perhaps by redefining 
academic success to include being at a certain class rank, rather than 
defining success by letter grades alone, or perhaps by identifying a 
particular sphere of success, such as moot court or other academic 
activities).100 
                                                                                                                          
98 See Jan E. Stets, Justice, Emotion, and Identity Theory, in ADVANCES IN IDENTITY THEORY 
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Self-verification strategies are not always apparent to the individual.  
Researchers have divided self-verifying strategies as “overt/behavioral” 
and “covert/cognitive.”101  Overt/behavioral strategies include the choices a 
person makes consciously—where to work and with whom to interact 
with.102  Thus, an attorney whose identity includes a strong commitment to 
public justice may consciously decide to take a job working for Legal Aid.  
Covert/cognitive strategies, by contrast, do not involve conscious choice.  
Instead, they include the cognitive biases described in Part II—both 
selective attention (“self-verifying information is given attention and 
processed, and information that is not self-confirming is ignored”) and 
selective interpretation (“endorsing feedback that fits self-views and 
denying feedback that does not fit self-views”).103 
Selective perception and related cognitive biases may offer a way to 
counteract the existence of non-verifying situational feedback (that is, 
external feedback that does not match a person’s internal view of 
themselves).  Empirical research has found that “[i]f self-discrepant 
feedback is unavoidable, people may construct the illusion of self-
confirming worlds by ‘seeing’ more support for their self-views than 
actually exists.”104  Thus, people with positive self-views will spend more 
time scrutinizing favorable feedback than unfavorable feedback, and after 
undergoing an evaluation they will remember more favorable statements 
than unfavorable statements.105 
People are also more trusting of information that confirms their self-
view.  Psychologist William Swann notes that “people may nullify 
discrepant evaluations by selectively dismissing incongruent feedback.”106  
When evaluations are proffered, people “express more confidence” in 
those evaluators whose conclusions match individuals’ self-conceptions.107 
These unconscious processes have a very real effect on judgment and 
“may systematically skew people’s perceptions of reality.”108  When these 
cognitive processes are invoked, people may “conclude that their social 
worlds are far more supportive of their self-views than is warranted.”109  
Thus, while the cognitive strategies associated with self-verification may 
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play a beneficial role on an individual level, they do not assist an attorney 
with the task of providing independent judgment—in fact, they inhibit it. 
C.  Self-Verification and Partisanship 
How does self-verification of attorneys’ role identities work in 
practice?  Judge John T. Noonan has described one case that exemplifies 
the factors at work in self-verification of an attorney’s role.110  In the 
1930s, attorney Hoyt Moore represented Bethlehem Steel Corporation.111  
When a company that Bethlehem very much wanted to acquire was placed 
in receivership, Moore bribed a federal judge overseeing the receivership 
to put Bethlehem in a position where it would be able to acquire the 
company.112  Moore was not motivated by money; in fact, his 
compensation was relatively insignificant.113  Instead, Noonan writes, 
Moore “identified with the client—an identification easier, rather than 
harder, when the client was not a single flesh and blood individual, but a 
corporation, which no one individual encapsulated. For many purposes, 
Moore was Bethlehem.  It became his alter ego.”114 
Noonan further argues that “[a]t the same time that [Moore] identified 
with the client, he wanted to prove to its officers, the men with whom he 
dealt, that he was the master of the situation, that there was nothing his 
client wanted that he could not bring off.”115  Thus, Moore’s identity 
standard defined him as a person with a high level of competence and 
mastery, one who could accomplish the company’s objectives.  Acquiring 
the company desired by Bethlehem allowed him to verify that identity—his 
success in the venture verified his standing as a titan of industry.  The 
psychological gain from self-verification motivated Moore to bribe a 
federal judge, even when no significant material gain was present. 
Of course, the desire for self-verification does not drive most attorneys 
to extreme or illegal behavior.  But empirical work supports Judge 
Noonan’s intuition that self-verification shapes attorney behavior and 
judgment, even if not typically to the degree found in Moore’s case.  The 
Gunz and Gunz study suggests that attorneys with a more salient 
organizational identity are more likely to support a course of action desired 
by corporate management, even when doing so would contravene 
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traditional professional obligations.116  Moore was not an employee of 
Bethlehem, but he nevertheless identified himself as an agent of the 
corporation who benefited psychologically from the corporation’s success.  
According to identity theory’s conception of self-verification, it makes 
sense that a more salient organizational identity would be linked with 
higher levels of selective attention to facts and circumstances favorable to 
the corporation. 
There are two possible explanations for why a more salient 
organizational identity would lead to a selective focus on information 
favorable to corporate management.  First, as Gunz and Gunz noted, a 
more salient organizational identity is correlated with a larger management 
role—those attorneys who were more involved in the corporation’s 
leadership structure and more responsible for managerial outcomes were 
more likely to have salient organizational identities.117  Given the 
attorneys’ management responsibilities, it is likely that verification of their 
organizational identities required a favorable managerial outcome—when 
the organization’s managers obtained their desired outcome, the 
organizational identity standard was verified.  When managerial goals were 
met, the attorneys received feedback verifying their success as agents of 
the corporation. 
Second, the organizational identity is, by its nature, more deferential to 
corporate management than is the professional identity.  While the 
organizational identity requires a favorable managerial outcome, it does 
not require that the attorney achieve results beyond those desired by 
corporate management.  Thus, when the attorney defers to the CEO on 
contracting decisions or privately advises management on the dangers of 
racist comments, the attorney has done enough to obtain positive feedback 
that reinforces the attorney’s identity as a valued employee. 
Given the alignment between the organization and the individual 
attorney, the attorney is predisposed to notice facts and circumstances that 
support organizational goals.  And when events or circumstances are 
subject to more than one interpretation, the attorney is motivated to 
interpret them in favor of the corporation.  Even when the information is 
not truly ambiguous, the attorney may be blind to non-supportive facts—in 
Swann’s words, the attorney may be “‘seeing’ more support . . . than 
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actually exists.”118 
An attorney with a more salient “lawyer” or “professional” identity 
faces different pressures.  On the one hand, there is likely to be less 
pressure to offer advice that management would find pleasing.  While self-
verification of the organizational identity requires feedback favorable to 
the organization’s management, self-verification of the professional 
identity, by contrast, does not require any particular organizational 
outcome.  As long as the attorney is satisfied that he or she has provided 
high-quality counsel, the identity standard is verified—whether or not 
management is actually pleased to receive the advice. 
On the other hand, a more salient professional identity may push the 
attorney to take actions beyond those that would satisfy the attorney with a 
more salient organizational identity.  While the attorney would have less of 
an interest in pleasing management, he or she would have a greater interest 
in ensuring that the attorney’s advice was heard by those empowered to 
make a decision.  After all, if the attorney stopped short of offering advice 
to the highest-level decision makers, he or she would not be fulfilling the 
expected lawyer role, which includes advising the corporation at the 
highest level.119  Thus, again, it makes sense that attorneys with a more 
salient professional identity were more willing to provide advice directly to 
the board of directors in both the racism vignette and the contracting 
vignette. 
Finally, while the organizational identity is associated with a stronger 
desire for an outcome favorable to management, the action of cognitive 
biases may actually prevent a favorable outcome from occurring.  In the 
racism vignette, for example, the attorneys with a more salient 
organizational identity were more willing to privately advise management 
to avoid public expressions of racism.  These attorneys may have 
interpreted the situation in the light most favorable to the corporation, 
assuming that management would indeed curtail the practices and 
underestimating the probability that they would come to light.  In the 
actual situation on which the vignette was based, the facts did come to 
light; perhaps unsurprisingly (to anybody not affiliated with the 
corporation), Texaco then faced a number of lawsuits and saw its stock 
decline.120  Managers who made the statements left the corporation and lost 
their retirement benefits as punishment.121 
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IV.  CASE STUDY—YOO, GOLDSMITH, AND THE TORTURE MEMOS 
The Gunz and Gunz study suggests that attorneys’ identities are indeed 
linked to judgment and behavior, just as identity theory suggests.  
However, the study remained hypothetical.  It asked attorneys to identify 
the correct course of action, but did not study what attorneys in real-life 
situations actually do when confronted with such ethical dilemmas.  Such 
real-life data would be exceedingly difficult to collect.  While it is easy 
enough to identify ethical dilemmas in hindsight, it is much more difficult 
to learn what attorneys were thinking as they made their decisions and 
offered their counsel.  Even if attorneys could be surveyed, their 
confidentiality obligations would generally prohibit them from disclosing 
information about their representation.122  And when ethical dilemmas (and 
associated corporate scandals) do arise, clients are particularly unlikely to 
consent to their attorneys’ disclosure of their thoughts and strategies, 
especially if they are facing a threat of litigation.123 
The Justice Department’s interrogation memos therefore provide an 
interesting opportunity to examine the connection between attorney 
identity and judgment in context.  The scandal surrounding these memos 
offers an important perspective on the relationship between identity and 
judgment.  Both the secrecy and the informational problems are 
minimized, as much of the information about the case has been made 
publicly available and/or declassified by the government, and both of the 
major participants in the drama have written books that provide a great 
deal of insight into their thoughts, motivations, and legal judgment. 
A.  Questioning the Memos 
In 2002, John Yoo, a deputy in the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”), 
prepared a memorandum124 opining in part that interrogations inflicting 
pain do not qualify as torture unless the pain rises “to a level that would 
ordinarily be associated with a sufficiently serious physical condition or 
injury such as death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body 
functions.”125  Yoo imported a definition of torture from a statute that 
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authorized benefits for emergency health conditions; the health benefit 
statute used the phrase “severe pain” as a possible indicator of an 
emergency condition that might cause serious harm if not immediately 
treated.126 
The memo also concluded that “there is [a] significant range of acts 
that though they might constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment,” they nevertheless “fail to rise to the level of torture.”127  In 
addition, it suggested that application of anti-torture laws to the challenged 
conduct “may be unconstitutional” if the President had authorized the acts 
under his Commander-in-Chief powers, and it further opined that 
“necessity or self-defense” could also provide adequate defenses to a 
potential prosecution for torture.128 
The 2002 memo was withdrawn two years later by Jack Goldsmith, 
who had been appointed to lead the OLC.129  Goldsmith concluded that the 
memo was poorly reasoned and represented a failure in legal judgment.130  
Outsiders generally agreed that the memo, at a minimum, reflected poor 
lawyering—it was “widely regarded as preposterous,”131 even 
“spectacularly bizarre.”132  The memo was criticized for defining torture 
“by lifting language from a Medicare statute on medical emergencies,” 
“ignor[ing] inconvenient Supreme Court precedents,” and “flatly 
misrepresent[ing] what sources said.”133  The revised memo omitted Yoo’s 
narrow definition of torture and abandoned its reliance on the Medicare 
statute.  While Goldsmith conceded that “[i]t is very hard to say in the 
abstract what the phrase ‘severe pain’ means,” he concluded that Yoo’s 
“clumsy definitional arbitrage didn’t even seem in the ballpark.”134 
Goldsmith questioned how Yoo, a good attorney and friend, could 
have written such a poorly reasoned memo: 
How could this have happened?  How could OLC have 
written opinions that, when revealed to the world weeks after 
the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, made it seem as though the 
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administration was giving official sanction to torture . . . . 
How could its opinions reflect such bad judgment, be so 
poorly reasoned, and have such terrible tone?135 
Again, the venality hypothesis came into play, as Goldsmith suggested that 
a combination of a fearful atmosphere and pressure from the White House 
may have played a role in creating the memo.136  But Yoo vehemently 
disagreed; he staunchly defended the memo’s reasoning and denied facing 
any White House pressure.137  The White House, he said, had been “hands 
off” when it came to drafting the memo, and he stood by its conclusions.138  
Furthermore, the White House seems to have lacked incentive to pressure 
Yoo to give the broad interpretation that he offered, given that even the 
narrower opinion later substituted for the original memo authorized the 
same interrogation procedures that the White House had inquired about.139  
Thus, it appears that Yoo’s memo had actually given a more deferential 
opinion than was needed to support the acknowledged interrogation 
procedures. 
While Yoo denies a political motivation in writing the original memo, 
he sees a political motivation in its withdrawal.  Referring to the decision 
to substitute a revised memo, he states,  “Its purpose was to give the White 
House political cover by making the language more vague, and thus, 
presumably, more politically correct.”140  Yoo decries the decision to 
withdraw the memo, asserting that “[i]t harmed our ability to prevent 
future al-Qaeda attacks by forcing our agents in the field to operate in a 
vacuum of generalizations.”141  He concludes that the focus on 
“professional responsibility” in providing reliable advice was merely 
political cover, “a short-term political maneuver in response to political 
criticism”: 
[T]he differences in the opinions were for appearances’ 
sake . . . . For some new officials at Justice, who came onto 
the job years after 9/11, withdrawing the 2002 opinion wasn’t 
enough.  It was as if, sensing the 2004 opinion’s ambivalence 
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and its decision to muddy the legal waters, these individuals 
decided they needed to go to extraordinary lengths to 
discredit the first opinion.  They ordered the opening of an 
investigation . . . to determine whether we had violated our 
professional responsibilities in providing legal advice.142 
Why would Yoo and Goldsmith have such radically different 
judgments about what interrogation procedures are authorized by law?  
Yoo’s memo has been widely criticized, even by those generally 
sympathetic to the administration.143  Goldsmith’s views, while still subject 
to criticism as overly favorable to torture, are generally considered legally 
reasonable if ill-advised—his views are not considered legally 
“preposterous,” as were Yoo’s.144  An examination of Yoo’s and 
Goldsmith’s books through the lens of identity theory suggests two 
explanations: a difference in the salience of their political identities and a 
different commitment to policy making roles in the Bush administration. 
B.  Multiple Roles: Policy Making and Providing Legal Advice 
Yoo and Goldsmith played different roles in the Bush administration.  
Yoo had a significant policy making role in addition to his position as legal 
counsel.  He was a member of the War Council, a “secretive five-person 
group with enormous influence over the administration’s antiterrorism 
policies.”145  He was also one of the few Executive Branch representatives 
at a series of meetings with Congressional leaders that developed 
legislation authorizing the use of military force against al-Qaeda.146 
Goldsmith, in contrast, focused on law, rather than policy.147  He 
acknowledged that he might be asked to opine about matters other than the 
law, and he was willing to do so:  “When appropriate, I put on my 
counselor’s hat and added my two cents about the wisdom of 
counterterrorism policies.”148  But ultimately he believed that any policy 
advice he offered must be subordinate to his role as a legal advisor; he 
wrote that his job “was not to decide whether these policies were wise.  It 
was to make sure they were implemented lawfully.”149 
Just as the Gunz and Gunz study demonstrated that a greater 
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involvement in management was linked with corporate counsel having a 
more salient organizational identity, it is likely that Yoo’s policy work and 
greater commitment to a policy making role gave him a more salient 
“policy maker” identity.  Others noticed that Yoo’s policy making role and 
his “close working relationship” with the White House “alienated his 
Department of Justice boss, John Ashcroft.”150  This alienation prevented 
Yoo from being promoted into the top OLC job ultimately held by 
Goldsmith.  The alienation may also have weakened Yoo’s ties to his role 
as legal counsel,151 while pushing him even farther into a policy making 
role. 
Thus, it appears that the role identities of “lawyer” and “policy maker” 
competed against each other to shape—and perhaps distort—Yoo’s view 
of the legal limits of torture.  Just as the lawyers who viewed themselves 
primarily as “employees” in the Gunz and Gunz study were more likely to 
view the world in accordance with corporate management, Yoo’s policy 
making role likely pushed him to view the situation in line with leaders of 
the Bush administration.152  Ironically, this shared perspective may have 
led Yoo to offer a more aggressive legal opinion than was actually required 
to meet the administration’s legal goals, and the opinion left the 
administration highly vulnerable to outside criticism.153  Goldsmith is 
critical of the administration’s tendency to bring Yoo and other lawyers 
into the policy making field, writing:  “The irony of the lawyer-dominated 
approach to counterterrorism policy is that the lawyers who didn’t do so 
well at statecraft also ended up not doing so well in the arena of their 
expertise.”154  It may well be that greater involvement in policy making did 
in fact cause Yoo and others to lose their independent perspective and to 
therefore lose their ability to accurately predict how the outside world 
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would view their legal opinions. 
C.  Salience of Political Identity 
Yoo and Goldsmith also appear to differ in the relative salience of their 
political identities.  On the surface, their political identities share many 
similarities.  Both identify themselves as conservative and Republican, and 
both worked in the Bush administration.  However, deeper examination 
suggests that a Republican identity was much more salient for Yoo than it 
was for Goldsmith. 
In his book, Goldsmith describes himself as “conservative,” but notes 
that he “didn’t know any Republican Party politicians” and “had never 
given money to a Republican campaign.”155  Goldsmith also states that he 
“lacked the usual political credentials for the [OLC] job.”156 
When Goldsmith was interviewed for the OLC position, the Deputy 
White House Counsel questioned why he had once donated to a 
Democratic friend’s campaign for office, but never donated money to a 
Republican campaign.  Goldsmith responded that “I considered myself 
conservative and a Republican, but that I had never had much interest in 
politics, and it had never occurred to me to give money to any campaign 
until [the friend] had asked.”157  The fact that it had “never occurred to 
him” to donate suggests that Goldsmith’s political identity was not 
particularly high in the salience hierarchy. 
Yoo’s political identity, on the other hand, appears to be significantly 
more salient.  He describes attending a pre-9/11 dinner with Ted and 
Barbara Olson, where they enjoyed talking “about the usual inside-the-
Beltway gossip, who was up, who was down, the biggest mistakes, the 
latest rivalries.”158  Yoo’s book suggests that his political identity was 
important to him; he spent time thinking about political intrigue and 
enjoyed sharing such discussions with his friends.159  Thus, while 
Goldsmith may have been a “conservative lawyer,” Yoo on the other hand 
seems to be a “conservative cause lawyer”—that is, he identified deeply 
and personally with the conservative cause.160 
Goldsmith’s less-salient political identity may have allowed him to be 
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more independent than Yoo.  Goldsmith noted that others in the 
administration were sometimes displeased with OLC opinions that offered 
advice they did not wish to hear.161  But he felt that he was “immune” to 
their disapproval “because the Senate had confirmed [him], because [he] 
loved [his] ‘real’ job as an academic, and because [he] had no higher 
government ambition.”162 
Thus, Yoo’s political identity may have been more closely tied to his 
legal opinions than Goldsmith’s was.  Yoo’s eagerness to discuss “who 
was up” and “who was down” in the political establishment suggests that, 
unlike Goldsmith, Yoo harbored greater political ambitions.  And there are 
other indications that Yoo’s political identity predominated.  For example, 
Yoo criticizes the lawyers who brought legal challenges to military 
commissions, noting that although they “were only doing their job by 
providing their clients with the most vigorous defense possible,” such 
“[l]awyering is beginning to strangle our government’s ability to fight and 
win the wars of the twenty-first century”—thus seeming to suggest that 
traditional lawyering should be subordinate to policies promoting national 
security.163 
Viewing Yoo’s and Goldsmith’s behavior through the lens of identity 
theory suggests an explanation for why the two men who seemed to have 
so much in common—both conservative, both academics, and both highly 
accomplished lawyers—could offer their client such radically different 
legal analyses.  Unlike Goldsmith, Yoo played a significant policy role in 
the Bush administration.  His later commentary suggests that his policy 
role predominated over his legal role.  Tellingly, his criticism of the 
decision to withdraw the August 2002 memo focuses on the policy 
ramifications (i.e., “harm[ing] our ability to prevent future [al–Qaeda] 
attacks”) rather than the quality of the legal advice itself.164  Yoo’s political 
identity also appeared to be significantly more salient than Goldsmith’s; 
though both were conservative, Yoo’s political identity was more likely to 
assert itself in his day-to-day life.  Two situational forces pushed Yoo to 
became closer to his client, the Bush administration.  Both his policy 
making role in the administration and his political identity, shared with 
other administration insiders, likely caused his judgment to more closely 
resemble that of other Bush administration officials.  Goldsmith, on the 
other hand, was able to be a more neutral adviser.  Thus, it appears that 
Yoo and Goldsmith’s differing roles and identity structures shaped their 
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judgment—and hence their advice to the Bush administration—in very 
different ways. 
D.  Legal Advice or Legal Cover? 
The argument that Yoo’s political identity rendered his legal advice 
less-than-independent and therefore fundamentally unreliable presupposes 
that Yoo’s memo was in fact intended to provide legal advice.  
Commentators have suggested, however, that Yoo’s memo may not have 
been intended to provide neutral advice at all.165  Instead, they suggest the 
memo may have been intended to provide “legal cover” to the 
administration.166  Perhaps the administration was not actually concerned 
with the legality of such interrogation methods, but merely wanted to be 
sure they could mount an “advice of counsel” defense if others sought to 
hold administration officials legally accountable. 
Even if one assumes that the Bush administration was seeking cover, 
rather than advice, the identity-theory analysis still stands.  Providing legal 
cover is essentially performing an advocacy role in the guise of legal 
advice.  A document that appears to be neutral advice to the client may in 
fact be written with an entirely different audience in mind.  Knowing that 
the client’s decision will ultimately face challenges, the attorney drafts a 
document that purports to offer legal advice, but is not actually intended to 
be relied upon by the client—instead, it is intended to persuade later 
readers that the client reasonably relied on the attorney’s advice.  In spite 
of the fact that it appears to be an advisory document, it is actually an 
advocacy document, much like an opening brief in a contested hearing.167 
But while lawyers’ roles in advocacy may be different from their roles 
as advisors, both roles contain one commonality: the need to accurately 
gauge how outsiders will react to a given course of action.  Just as an 
advisor needs to predict such reactions in order to advise the client, so too 
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does an advocate need to predict how a decision maker is likely to rule.  
Just as a litigator cannot know which arguments to emphasize at trial 
without an idea of how a judge would likely view them, so too government 
attorneys cannot provide good “legal cover” unless they can accurately 
predict how persuasive their arguments will be when the challenged 
conduct comes to light. 
For advocates as well as advisors, partisan blindness can be equally 
debilitating.  As noted in Part III, the study participants who represented 
plaintiffs or defendants tended to overestimate the strength of their case 
and to underestimate the strength of their opponents’ case.  Similarly, Yoo 
also seems to have overestimated the persuasiveness of his arguments 
supporting his rather extreme view of executive power.  Yoo’s legal 
analysis, which imported the Medicare statute’s characterization of 
“medical emergency” to define the meaning of torture, failed to persuade 
even those most sympathetic to the administration’s goals.  In the end, 
scholars have concluded that it was the values of a “lawyers’ craft” that 
allowed Goldsmith to “identify the torture memos’ troubling [legal] errors” 
and to put forward a more legally supportable analysis of interrogation 
methods.168  As a result, it appears that Yoo’s more salient organizational 
identity did not actually serve the Bush administration well; regardless of 
whether his intent was to provide legal cover or legal advice, Yoo’s 
counsel ultimately was of little help to his client. 
V.  SECURING INDEPENDENT LEGAL ADVICE 
The lessons learned from the case study of the interrogation memos, 
combined with the empirical findings from identity theorists, suggest that 
certain situations are likely to trigger predictable cognitive biases in legal 
counsel.  First, attorneys with multiple role identities such as 
employee/lawyer or policy maker/lawyer may find that the relative 
salience of the employee and policy maker identities nudge them to offer 
more deference to their organization.  Second, attorneys with role identities 
closely aligned to the client’s goals may be subject to the same cognitive 
distortions suffered by the client, him or herself.  Thus, clients may face a 
conundrum in which the most dedicated attorneys are the worst positioned 
to offer independent counsel.169 
This section examines some mechanisms for minimizing cognitive 
biases and enhancing independent counsel.  Ultimately, it concludes no 
single proposal can solve the problems of attorneys’ cognitive biases.  
Some of the proposals offered—including greater accountability measures 
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and increased education—are unlikely to address the more deeply held 
unconscious biases.170  Others proposals, such as requiring a more limited 
role for lawyers, have detriments from the emotional distance of counsel 
that outweigh the potential benefits of increased neutrality.171 
Instead of an overarching solution, this Article suggests that progress 
will occur only at the margins, and only if clients and attorneys are able to 
recognize situations where neutrality is particularly at risk.  The Article 
uses insights from identity theory to identify two situations in which the 
risk of biased judgment is particularly high.  The first arises when the 
attorney occupies another role within an organizational client, such as 
manager or policy maker, at the same time as he or she is functioning as 
counsel.  The second arises when the client and attorney share common 
goals that are closely linked to the attorney’s role identity—when, for 
example, the attorney both closely identifies with a particular political 
party and, at the same time, represents a client whose legal goals overlap 
with the political party’s goals.172  This second situation is equivalent to the 
broad definition of “cause lawyering” adopted by a number of scholars.173 
A.  Traditional Proposals 
Numerous commentators have offered suggestions aimed at reducing 
cognitive bias, enhancing independent judgment, or both.  Some of the 
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most commonly proposed solutions include debiasing education174 and 
accountability mechanisms.175  Possible techniques of managing bias, if not 
eliminating it, include deferring to clients for consent to the potential 
conflict of interest,176 enforcing role separation and paternalistically 
limiting the roles that an attorney may play in a particular matter.177  
However, while these strategies may be appropriate in many situations, this 
Article argues that they cannot effectively solve the problem of lawyers’ 
cognitive bias and therefore cannot alone solve the problems caused by a 
lack of independent legal advice. 
1.  Creating Accountability Mechanisms 
Some commentators suggest that making lawyers more accountable for 
their clients’ behavior can motivate them to offer more reliable and 
independent advice.178  This view tends to give credence to the “venality 
hypothesis” described in Part I.179  It assumes that lawyers’ willingness to 
rubber-stamp a client’s decision is rationally motivated by an effort to 
please the client, and it supposes that creating countervailing incentives 
will likewise motivate attorneys to offer more independent advice.180 
While the venality hypothesis may explain some lapses in lawyer 
behavior, it does not explain those cases in which lawyers seem to lack any 
external incentive to give their clients self-serving advice.  Clients may 
sometimes pressure attorneys for favorable results, but client pressure is 
not an element of every case—after all, clients are not always looking for 
an attorney just to rubber-stamp desired actions.  A rubber-stamp mentality 
may indeed please some clients, at least in the short term, as such advice 
may “ma[k]e it easier for them to do things they wanted to do—overstate 
income on financial statements, underpay taxes, or torture people.”181  The 
long-term consequences, however, are likely to more than offset such 
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short-term satisfaction.  When clients must re-state income, pay back taxes 
(with penalties), and face unforeseen political and legal consequences for 
their decisions, they are likely to be highly dissatisfied with their lawyers, 
especially when they trusted that their lawyers’ advice would help them 
avoid such consequences.182 
And even if a client is looking for “legal cover” rather than 
independent legal advice, the client still needs an attorney who can 
accurately predict how such “cover” will be perceived by outsiders.  If the 
attorney’s judgment is so clouded that he or she cannot see how an outsider 
will react to various legal strategies, then the attorney cannot hope to enact 
a legal shield in support of the client’s actions.  Whether the client is 
seeking independent advice or legal cover, the client’s autonomy depends 
on an attorney with unclouded judgment. 
On one level, a client may want to hear that conduct she wants to 
engage in is legal, since that makes it easier for the client to engage in the 
desired activity.  But the client may face long-term consequences for such 
illegal conduct.  While a client can choose to act illegally, the 
consequences of illegal conduct should not come as a surprise to the client.  
Just as a patient can take action that is contrary to medical advice, a client 
can take action even though it is against the law.  But such a decision 
should not be accompanied by his lawyer’s false assurance that the conduct 
is legal.183 
Thus, even though clients may be happy to be told that their preferred 
course of action is legally permissible, they are likely to agree with Walter 
Dellinger, the former head of the OLC, who concluded that “[y]ou won’t 
be doing your job well, and you won’t be serving your client’s interest, if 
you rubber-stamp everything the client wants to do.”184 
In addition to overstating clients’ desire for self-serving advice, those 
who support accountability mechanisms as a cure for lawyers’ failure to 
exercise independent judgment also overstate the likelihood that attorneys 
will properly calculate the incentives offered by such accountability 
mechanisms.  Lawyers who believe firmly (if erroneously) in the advice 
they give their clients are unlikely to be affected by potential sanctions 
aimed at curbing disingenuous advice.  Research suggests that, at best, 
there is no clear link between material incentives and the ability to 
overcome cognitive biases: 
[S]ome studies report a negative correlation between 
                                                                                                                          
182 Bruce A. Green, The Market for Bad Legal Scholarship: William H. Simon’s Experiment in 
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financial incentives and the appearance of certain cognitive 
biases; some studies report no correlation between incentives 
and the likelihood of subjects’ showing a cognitive bias; and 
some conclude that the effect of the incentive is a function of 
its size, with cognitive performance improving as the size of 
the monetary reward increases.185 
When “‘intuition or habit provides an optimal answer and thinking harder 
makes things worse,’” research suggests that material incentives are likely 
to be counterproductive.186  As the next section explains, bias resulting 
from partisan affiliation with a client resists eradication through additional 
thought or education, and such attempts may even unwittingly reinforce 
the bias.187  As a result, it is unlikely that external accountability 
mechanisms or material incentives can overcome the judgment-clouding 
effects of partisan bias. 
2.  Debiasing 
Because cognitive biases render accountability mechanisms 
ineffective, it would be helpful if there were a way to combat these biases.  
While debiasing strategies can be effective in some cases, they are not 
likely to be particularly effective at combating attorneys’ unconscious 
partisan biases. 
One of the primary debiasing mechanisms is to educate subjects about 
the existence and effects of common cognitive biases.188  In theory, it is an 
attractive option—it seems intuitive that, once informed of the prevalence 
of cognitive bias, lawyers will be more able to avoid it.  But the evidence 
regarding effectiveness of such education is, at best, mixed.  Some studies 
have found that informing people about the existence of common biases 
can help controvert the effects of those biases, especially when people are 
asked to “question their own judgment by explicitly considering 
counterarguments to their own thinking.”189  Other studies, however, have 
suggested that education is actually counterproductive—that it reinforces 
certain cognitive biases instead of combating them.190 
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When attorneys’ cognitive biases are deep-seated and unconscious, 
education is least likely to be effective.  This bias blind spot may even 
cause efforts at maintaining neutrality to backfire, increasing—rather than 
decreasing—the original partisan commitment.  In a follow-up to the 
roommate study described in Part II,191 researchers attempted to educate 
some of the participants about the “liking bias” and to ask others to make 
an extra effort at fairness.192  The fairness instruction, given to some 
subjects, stated that “[w]e are interested in determining which age groups 
can be good mediators of conflict.  A good mediator is someone who can 
be fair, open-minded, and unbiased.  Please try to be as fair as possible.”193  
The bias-awareness instruction, given to other subjects, stated: 
Previous research shows that when people learn about a 
conflict, their responses are heavily influenced by how much 
they like each of the people involved.  We tend to accept the 
actions of the person we like more than the actions of the 
person we do not like as much.  As you think about the 
following conflict, please become aware of your natural likes 
and dislikes, and try not to let them affect your responses.194 
Neither instruction made students any fairer than those given a neutral 
instruction.  The fairness instruction, in fact, backfired and caused the 
study participants to be significantly more committed to the “more 
likeable” character.195  The bias-awareness instruction also had a slight, 
though not statistically significant, correlation with answers in favor of the 
more likeable character.  Thus, the researchers concluded that while such 
motivating instructions may make the participants put additional time and 
effort into thinking about the conflict, they do not change the outcome.196  
Participants believe they are “already being fair.”197  Thus, participants 
simply put the extra time and effort into supporting the position they 
already favored, not on rethinking the position with which they 
disagreed.198 
Because the partisan bias operates at such a deeply unconscious level, 
and because people remain unaware of their own partisanship, it is difficult 
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to overcome.  As one scholar has pointed out, “[b]ecause we perceive 
ourselves to be objective, we have little reason to think critically about 
whether our beliefs are, in fact, correct.”199  As a result, “our biased 
theories, beliefs, and expectations, tend to persevere.”200 
3.  Treating the Potential for Bias as a Conflict of Interest 
Another possibility is to view bias based on partisan affiliation as a 
conflict of interest between lawyer and client and therefore to handle it 
through disclosure and consent.  Under this model, lawyers would inform 
their clients that independence may be impaired if (1) the attorney is acting 
as manager or policy maker in addition to the lawyer role; or (2) the 
attorney’s representation is motivated in part by a role or group identity 
shared with the client, such as political affiliation.  Once the disclosure is 
made, the clients could choose whether to consent to the risk that the 
attorney’s judgment would be impaired by his or her other role obligations. 
The consent-and-disclose approach fits in with the regulatory rules on 
conflicts of interest.  Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, most 
attorney conflicts of interest are “consentable” if the risks of representation 
are fully disclosed to the client and the client gives informed consent to 
them.201  A few conflicts, however, are deemed to be so disabling that the 
lawyer cannot undertake the representation even with consent.202  Other 
conflicts may present an especially high risk of attorney self-dealing; in 
such a case, client consent may be allowed only if the lawyer advises the 
client about the desirability of seeking independent counsel from another 
attorney,203 or, in some cases, if the client actually obtains independent 
counsel.204 
Furthermore, the risks posed by partisan attorneys are similar to the 
risks posed by conflicts of interest more generally.205  Scholars have argued 
that the conflict of interest doctrine is essentially a structure for 
determining “how to distinguish risks which are acceptable from those 
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which are unacceptable.”206  By requiring that the risks be disclosed to the 
client and allowing the client to choose whether to accept those risks, the 
model “gives the client some choice about the questions of both magnitude 
and justifiability of the risk she is willing to have her lawyer encounter.”207 
But while a disclose-and-consent policy might look appealing in 
theory, it is problematic in practice.  Recent research suggests that such 
disclosure may have “perverse effects” that lead to a less accurate 
assessment of the risks than without such disclosure.208  In one study, 
participants were asked to judge the value of a jar of coins.209  Participants 
were randomly assigned to be either an estimator, who would provide the 
official estimate of value, or an advisor, who would assist the estimator 
with his or her evaluation.  Estimators were paid according to the accuracy 
of their evaluation, but the advisors were paid by how high the estimator’s 
guess was—thus creating a clear financial incentive for the advisor to offer 
an inflated assessment.  In half of the cases the advisor disclosed this 
conflict of interest, and in half of the cases the advisor did not.210 
Under the disclose-and-consent model of conflicts of interest, one 
would expect to see estimators discounting the advisor’s assessment when 
the conflict was disclosed, thus compensating for the obvious conflict.  In 
fact, there was no statistically significant change in the estimators’ 
discounting practices.211  But what did change significantly was the 
advisors’ assessments—when they disclosed the conflict, they suggested 
much higher values to the estimators.  Because the estimators failed to 
discount the biased advice, their guesses were significantly higher when 
the conflict was disclosed than when it was not disclosed. 
The results of this study suggest that clients may not be well equipped 
to discount a lawyer’s advice when a potential conflict of interest is 
disclosed.  It is not entirely clear why the advisors’ advice changed after 
disclosure.  The researchers offer two possible hypotheses.  First, perhaps 
the advisors expected the estimators to discount their advice once informed 
of the potential for bias, and they wanted to counteract that effect.212  Or 
perhaps the advisors felt “morally licensed” to pursue their own self-
interest once the disclosure was made, as the estimators then had the same 
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information available to them as the advisors.213  Both explanations are 
plausible, and both suggest that disclosure is not a sufficient remedy for the 
conflict of interest posed by biased advice.  Unless the client is both 
willing to discount the advice offered by a biased attorney and able to 
accurately calculate the effect of that bias on the advice offered, disclosure 
cannot remedy the effects of partisan bias.214 
4.  Regulating Role Separation 
Given the difficulty of overcoming attorneys’ cognitive bias, some 
commentators have recommended mechanisms to regulate role 
separation—either by adopting rules that encourage lawyers’ independence 
from clients or by prohibiting lawyers from playing multiple roles within 
an organization.  One commentator, for example, has suggested that law 
schools socialize young lawyers into professional independence,215 that 
judges use their appointment power to require attorneys to “represent 
people outside their standard client base,”216 and that states apply a 
“[n]arrow construction of the [conflict of interest] rules”217 to create market 
incentives for lawyers to represent clients outside their typical range. 
Others have suggested that lawyers should not play multiple roles 
within an organization, either by participating in corporate management (in 
the case of in-house counsel) or serving on the client’s board of directors 
(in the case of outside counsel).218  Commentators posit that removing 
lawyers from management roles allows the attorneys to focus exclusively 
on providing legal advice and therefore removes much of the temptation to 
shade their advice “in the direction of what the [top management team] 
would like to hear, rather than what it should be hearing.”219 
Enforcing such role separation may well reduce the role conflicts that 
inhibit independent judgment.  But such a separation entails two significant 
disadvantages.  The first disadvantage is one of knowledge: the more 
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removed counsel is from the client, the less information the attorney is 
likely to have about the subject matter of his or her legal advice.  The 
attorney will not be as well-informed, and therefore her advice simply 
cannot be as responsive as it would be if, for example, the attorney served 
on the top management team and possessed the full range of information 
known to management. 
The second disadvantage is one of motivation.  Emotional proximity to 
the client may lead to partisan bias, but emotional distance is not 
necessarily good for the client either.  An old joke illustrates the downside 
of too much emotional distance between lawyer and client: the client, a 
criminal defendant, has just lost at trial.  “‘What happens now?’ the 
horrified client asks.”220  The attorney replies, “‘Well, you go to jail—and I 
go to lunch.’”221 
For many lawyers—particularly those who represent clients from a 
different social stratum than their own—the joke contains a grain of 
truth.222  When there is a great deal of emotional distance between lawyer 
and client, the lawyer is less likely to be troubled by a negative outcome 
for the client, even when the client faces a potentially traumatic upheaval.  
The distant relationship allows the lawyer to offer independent—even 
disinterested—advice, but it does so at the cost of reducing the motivation 
to push for a positive outcome.  For example, a public defender, who 
represents predominantly economically marginalized criminal defendants, 
reported that frustration in dealing with his clients made him less likely to 
offer strategic advice:  “I can’t talk to these clients—it’s frustrating and 
you never really do get through to them.  So if they want their jury trial, 
then OK, I’ll give it to them.”223  The lawyer made it clear that he felt more 
comfortable with other lawyers and judges than he did with his clients:  “I 
prefer to deal with the people of the court—I’d rather talk and argue my 
case with reasonable people in court, instead of arguing with my 
clients.”224 
Of course, these are extreme examples from a very specialized practice 
area.  Even with enforced role separation, it is unlikely that corporate and 
governmental lawyers would become as disconnected from their clients as 
this public defender was.  But even a much-less-extreme version of this 
disaffection can be disadvantageous to clients who expect their attorneys to 
fully support their interests. 
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B.  Risk Recognition and Identity Salience 
Ideally, attorneys should offer their clients a balance of zealous 
advocacy and independent advice.  In practice, this balance is hard to 
achieve.  When attorneys are most motivated to zealously represent their 
clients, a partisan bias may shade and distort their legal advice, rendering it 
less than reliable.225  None of the traditional proposals offered to correct 
this bias fully solve the problem; as discussed above, neither increased 
accountability mechanisms nor education about cognitive bias are likely to 
cure the bias blind spot.  Nor is requiring disclosure of the potential for 
bias a sufficient cure, as clients are likely to overestimate their attorneys’ 
ability to compensate for such risks.  Finally, mandating role separation 
may go too far in reducing attorneys’ motivation to provide diligent and 
zealous representation. 
But even in the absence of a single overarching solution, there are still 
methods that attorneys and clients can use to combat the judgment failures 
arising from partisan bias.  This Article draws on social science research to 
suggest strategies that both lawyers and clients can take to minimize the 
risk of overly partisan legal advice.  First, it offers recommendations for 
identifying the situations most likely to trigger partisan bias.  Second, once 
such situations are identified, it offers suggestions for minimizing the risks 
posed by lawyers’ partisan identification with clients. 
1.  Recognizing Situations Likely to Lead to Partisan Bias 
Identity theory can help identify situations in which attorneys are at 
high risk of having their judgment colored by partisan bias.  Of course, one 
of the challenges of cognitive biases is that individuals are unaware of 
them.  And the partisan bias is particularly susceptible to such a blind spot, 
as it operates unconsciously even as individuals perceive themselves to be 
objective.226  Thus, it is important to have a way of recognizing when 
partisan bias is likely to sway attorneys’ judgment that does not require the 
attorneys themselves to be aware of that bias.  While identity theory cannot 
pinpoint such situations precisely, it can provide insight into situations 
particularly likely to facilitate the partisan bias. 
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As discussed above, identity theory suggests that attorneys may be 
particularly vulnerable to cognitive bias in two situations.227  The first 
situation occurs when a separate professional role competes with the 
traditional lawyer role.  Thus, an in-house attorney who is asked to play 
both a managerial role and a legal role, or a government attorney who 
possesses both policy making and legal responsibilities may be particularly 
vulnerable to partisan bias.  In this situation, the risk is that the attorney’s 
legal role will be so subordinated to the managerial or policy making role 
(that is, the professional identity is significantly lower in the salience 
hierarchy than the organizational identity) that the attorney’s judgment is 
filtered through a managerial/policy lens.228 
In this situation, the attorney is likely to overestimate the strength of 
his or her employer’s position and to underestimate potential liability.  
Identity theory suggests that this effect is part of the self-verification 
process, as the attorney seeks to maintain his or her self-conceptions within 
each of these roles.  This self-verification process puts different pressures 
on the professional identity than on the “manager” of “policy maker” 
identity.  Self-verification of the professional identity does not require any 
particular outcome for the organization as a whole.  As long as the attorney 
is perceived to offer competent advice, the attorney’s internal role 
standard—how she sees herself (for example, as a competent advisor)—
will match her reflected appraisal (she will perceive that others also view 
her to be a competent advisor).  But self-verification of a “manager” or 
“policy maker” identity requires much more; only if the organization is 
able to meet its goals will the manager/policy maker also be perceived as 
successful.  While a person may be perceived as a “good lawyer” if she 
offers sound (though unwanted) advice, that person will not be perceived 
as a “good manager” if her actions directly thwart the company’s goals.229 
When a person filling both lawyer and manager roles is faced with a 
situation where he or she cannot verify both identities (perhaps because 
negative legal advice, while sound, would prohibit the company’s 
management from taking desired actions), then the attorney is at risk for 
developing cognitive biases in favor of management.  The attorney would 
be vulnerable to the “covert” self-verification strategies of selective 
attention and interpretation, where “self-verifying information is given 
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attention and processed, and information that is not self-confirming is 
ignored,” and individuals “endors[e] feedback that fits self-views and 
deny[ ] feedback that does not fit self-views.”230  By unconsciously 
ignoring unfavorable information, the attorney is able to offer legal advice 
favorable to management without violating his or her self-perception of 
competent lawyering. 
The second situation posing a high risk of cognitive bias occurs when a 
role identity high in the lawyer’s salience hierarchy (such as Yoo’s identity 
as a conservative activist) corresponds with the client’s goal.  In Yoo’s 
case, for example, his conservative political identity aligned closely with 
the Bush administration’s goals—but it also left him subject to the same 
blind spots, unable to see how others would view his legal opinions as 
overreaching and unsupported. 
This situation of alignment between lawyer identity and client goal 
may be functionally the same as “cause lawyering,” which is often defined 
by a “deep identification with and commitment to” a cause, such that the 
lawyer specifically seeks out clients whose legal needs align with that 
cause.231  Attorneys who view themselves as “cause lawyers” and share 
common goals with their clients may similarly share blind spots with 
them.232  Again, identity theory suggests that the self-verification 
mechanism comes into play.  The cause lawyer’s more salient identity is, 
for example, “conservative activist,” “civil liberties activist,” or “poverty 
lawyer.”  Self-verification of such an identity requires success in moving 
the cause forward.  Just as the lawyer/manager had an unconscious 
incentive to view the facts in favor of corporate management, the cause 
lawyer has an unconscious incentive to view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the cause.  To the extent that the client shares the same 
commitment to the cause, the lawyer’s cognitive biases are likely to mirror 
the client’s, as seemed to happen with Yoo.  These biases render the 
lawyer unable to either offer neutral advice or to accurately predict how 
decision makers will respond to various avenues of advocacy. 
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If the client is less committed to the cause than the lawyer, then the 
lawyer may simply favor the cause over the client’s individualized 
interests.  For example, in Roe v. Wade, attorney Sarah Weddington 
viewed the case as “one facet of a collective effort to expand women’s 
reproductive rights.”233  Her client, however, was primarily “interested in 
terminating the pregnancy that was the source of her current dilemma,” and 
was “neither politically aware nor committed.”234  At the outset of the case, 
Weddington made a strategic choice not to pursue a narrow argument that 
the Texas abortion statute should have a rape exception, but chose instead 
to focus on the broader issue of the statute’s constitutionality as a whole.  It 
was not clear, at the time she made the decision, which strategy would be 
more likely to succeed for her client.235 
Assuming Weddington even considered an argument based on a rape 
exception, she may have been predisposed to underestimate its likelihood 
of success; prevailing on that exception would not help the larger cause.  
Critics of cause lawyering suggest that even in the absence of cognitive 
bias, partisan affiliation with a cause may push a lawyer to seek results that 
do not serve the client’s individual legal needs.236  When the lawyer’s 
affiliation with the cause also prompts partisan bias, this effect is 
magnified.  In that case, the lawyer’s unconscious bias influences him or 
her to view the legal situation in the light most favorable to the cause, and 
the lawyer may therefore overlook non-cause-related strategies that would 
benefit the individual client.  Not only does the lawyer push for a positive 
cause-related outcome, but she may not even recognize the strengths of 
alternative legal strategies. 
2.  The Situational Effect on Identity Salience 
The prior subsection argued that identity theory can help identify 
particular situations in which attorneys are likely to be particularly 
susceptible to partisan bias, and it distinguished two particular high-risk 
situations: (1) those in which the attorney plays more than one professional 
role in an organization; and (2) those in which the attorney is motivated by 
a deep commitment to, and identification with, a social cause beyond the 
case itself.  In both situations, the attorney’s legal judgment is affected 
when the “professional” identity is subordinate to the competing identity—
a “manager,” “policy maker,” or “employee” identity in the first instance, 
and a cause-related role identity such as “conservative activist” in the 
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second instance.  This Article has argued that when one of these competing 
identities is more salient than the professional identity, the attorney is more 
likely to unconsciously engage in selective attention, selective perception, 
and related biases in an effort to verify that identity.  By contrast, when the 
professional identity is more salient, the attorney is more likely to offer 
neutral advice and better able to predict how outside decision makers will 
evaluate a legal question.  In the absence of an overarching solution to 
eliminate the larger problem of potential bias and conflict of interest, the 
question then becomes whether there are nevertheless steps that can be 
taken at the margin to facilitate a more salient professional identity.  This 
Article argues that there are indeed such steps. 
In recent years, both social scientists and legal scholars have begun to 
focus on the power of situational influences, finding that “seemingly small 
features of social situations can have massive effects on people’s behavior” 
across a variety of contexts.237  There is no reason that attorney judgment 
should be different.  This Article therefore posits a model of situational 
influence—that situations can act in conjunction with lawyers’ identity 
structures to “transform the ease or difficulty of certain courses of 
action.”238  Although an individual lawyer’s identity structure may cause 
him or her to be particularly susceptible to particular cognitive biases in the 
scenarios identified above, small changes in situation can increase the 
attorney’s reliance on his or her professional identity, rather than an 
organizational or cause-related identity, when a client needs more neutral 
legal advice. 
First, research suggests that attorneys can take steps to raise the 
salience of the professional identity, increasing the probability that the 
professional identity will be activated in a particular situation.  Both the 
time spent in the role and the connections maintained in that role are 
correlated with the salience of the role identity.239  So an attorney who 
spends more time focused on providing legal advice (rather than 
management of policy making) is likely to have a more salient professional 
identity.  Similarly, if the attorney connects to other individuals who share 
that identity, it will also be more salient—so, for example, a reproductive-
rights attorney who wants to avoid falling prey to unconscious bias could 
spend time in a group based on participants’ shared profession (for 
example, a local bar association group) rather than solely spending time in 
groups with a shared social cause.  By increasing the time spent connecting 
with other people over more general professional concerns, the attorney 
would likely find that her professional identity rises in salience as 
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compared to her cause identity.240  The attorney would remain no less 
committed to the cause of reproductive rights, but the increased salience of 
her professional identity would make it more accessible when she is asked 
to make a legal judgment. 
Even a modest increase in the salience of the attorney’s professional 
identity may have a significant impact on the attorney’s legal judgment in 
practice.  Recent research has looked at the impact of the strength and 
salience of both a “worker” identity and “moral” identity on the decision to 
cheat in a laboratory study.241  The researchers found that each of these 
identities influenced participants’ propensity to cheat in opposite 
directions—for every unit increase in the worker identity, odds of cheating 
increased ninety-six percent, but for every unit increase in the moral 
identity, the odds of cheating decreased by sixty percent.242  A unit change 
in the worker identity had a greater impact on the outcome than did a unit 
change in the moral identity.  Thus, the researchers concluded that both 
identities were operative in the situation, but that the worker identity was 
more salient than the moral identity.243 
It seems likely that the same effect may occur when lawyers’ 
competing identities are both activated—both the organizational identity 
and the professional identity may be activated when in-house counsel is 
asked for legal advice, for example.  When the attorney’s advice is 
unconsciously biased in favor of the organization, then the attorney’s 
organizational identity ends up influencing the advice more than his or her 
professional identity.  If so, then increasing the salience of the professional 
identity should also increase its ultimate influence on the attorney’s 
judgment and presumably decrease the incidence of biased advice. 
As noted above, the strategies of increasing time and commitment to a 
professional identity increase the identity’s overall salience within the 
attorney’s hierarchy of identities.  But there are also strategies that can 
further increase salience situationally; research suggests that “the identity 
hierarchy gets slightly re-ordered within a situation as the situation triggers 
the salience of some identities over others.”244  This research suggests that 
an identity can be “primed” through reflection to achieve increased 
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salience in a given situation, making it more likely that the identity will be 
activated in a given situation.245  For example, writing and describing the 
words “caring,” “compassionate,” “kind,” and related terms worked to 
prime a moral identity.246  Study participants in the primed condition were 
more likely to report negative emotions after reading a news story about 
the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners and were less likely to express moral 
disengagement.247 
There are a number of ways that an attorney could prime a professional 
identity.  Again, interacting with others in a professional capacity may 
have such an effect—sharing professional expectations and discussing the 
legal ramifications of a particular issue may increase its salience relative to 
an organizational or cause-related identity.248  Even if privilege concerns or 
other issues precluded discussing the case with others, the attorney could 
still individually reflect on issues of independence and neutrality. 
One type of personal reflection, which David Luban has termed 
“Socratic Skepticism,” may be especially helpful at combating the 
cognitive biases caused by the subordination of a lawyer’s professional 
identity.  Luban describes the skepticism as taking “a stance of perpetual 
doubt toward one’s own pretensions as well as the pretensions of others . . . 
by trying to make a habit of doubting one’s own righteousness, of 
questioning one’s own moral beliefs, of scrutinizing one’s own 
behavior.”249  Attorneys with strong organizational or cause-related 
identities are especially likely to benefit from taking a skeptical approach 
to their own legal advice, and to focus their skepticism particularly on 
issues of independence and neutrality.  The very process of reflecting on 
these values may act to prime the attorney’s professional identity and thus 
increase its salience in the decision making process.250 
Finally, strategies to increase the situational salience of an attorney’s 
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professional identity may incorporate elements of some of the traditional 
proposals discussed above, such as accountability mechanisms, education, 
disclosure and consent, or role separation.  While none of the proposals 
appears to fully solve the problem of attorney bias, elements of those 
proposals may nevertheless be valuable for activating an attorney’s 
professional identity, especially to the extent that they encourage the 
attorney to focus on the particular aspects of independence and neutrality 
that may be lacking when the attorney’s organization or cause-related 
identity is more salient.  A legal team might therefore adopt an 
accountability device of evaluating attorneys specifically on measures of 
neutrality and independence—performed either by a managing attorney or 
through peer evaluations.  The very mention of these factors in the 
evaluation may act to prime the attorney’s professional identity. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
When onlookers ask, “Where were the lawyers?” after a high-profile 
corporate or governmental scandal in which there were “red flags waving 
all over the place,”251 the answer may be that the lawyers’ partisan 
affiliation with their client blinded them to those flags.  Relying on an 
identity-theory explanation of lawyer behavior, this Article argues that 
attorneys may be particularly susceptible to such a partisan bias in two 
situations: first, where the lawyer performs a policy making or managerial 
role in the client’s organization in addition to providing legal services, and 
second, where the attorney is motivated by a deep commitment to, and 
identification with, a social cause beyond the case itself.  In both of these 
cases, the lawyer’s professional identity is at risk of being subordinated to 
an organizational or cause-related identity, and in such a case, the lawyer’s 
judgment is less likely to be neutral or independent. 
These situations present a conundrum for the client: the very factors 
that motivate the attorney to provide zealous, committed representation 
also inhibit the attorney’s ability to offer unbiased, independent advice.  
Because traditional proposals for eliminating or managing bias appear 
unlikely to provide a comprehensive solution to the cognitive biases that 
arise from attorneys’ partisan affiliation with clients, this Article 
recommends a more modest approach to increase the salience of lawyers’ 
professional identities and to minimize the biases that result from 
subordination of that identity.  Increasing the time spent participating in 
professional activities and increasing the number of connections to others 
with a similar professional identity may help to increase the salience of that 
identity.  Similarly, reflecting on the need for neutrality and independence 
may also activate the lawyer’s professional identity in a given situation.  
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While these are small changes and not overarching solutions, even a small 
change in identity salience can influence the attorney’s legal judgment at 
the margin in close calls. 
